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Abstract Cross-border transactions are generating corresponding globalisation of
law enforcement efforts. Culture has significantly influenced the legal analysis of
anti-bribery law. With the increase of transnational bribery, benefits from globali-
sation will be undermined unless an effective legal regime can mitigate the harm of
bribery. It is perceived that corruption in China is more prevalent than in the West
given its embedded place in Chinese culture. It is further alleged that Chinese
multinational companies (MNCs) are taking advantage of an unlevel playing field,
as they are not subject to stringently-enforced anti-bribery laws. This hypothesis
creates a myriad of anti-bribery problems in terms of legislation and enforcement,
which particularly manifest in China’s perceived cultural toleration of bribery.
Cultural assumptions undermine the global anti-bribery regime and compromise
potential collaborative anti-bribery efforts across jurisdictions in a rapidly global-
izing world. The Chinese culture does not necessarily impede China’s
criminalisation of paying bribes to foreign officials. It is argued that the cultural role
should not be overestimated, otherwise the hazard of the ethnocentric engagement
with the Chinese culture would affect the ability of foreign MNCs to integrate their
global compliance programmes. Multinationals can only mitigate their exposure to
criminal liability globally, provided that they comply robustly with anti-bribery
laws of both home and host jurisdictions.
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1 Introduction
Bribery contradicts the notion of the free market characterised by transparency and
fair competition. It subverts the trust between businesses and governments around
the world.1 Bribery is not in China’s national interest. Pervasive corruption will
inexorably undermine respect for the rule of law, generating serious distortions in
the efficiency and fairness of the Chinese society.2 As a powerful driving force
reshaping the world in the twenty first century, globalisation inevitably brings
transnational bribery with multinational company (MNC) transactions stretching
across borders.3 It is critical that there is no legal globalisation.4 The accelerating
rate of globalisation has been accompanied by heightened awareness of differing
attributes and values in regards to bribery.5 A deep-rooted culture of gift-giving tests
the boundaries of Western moral, ethical and financial best practice principles. It
poses a substantial challenge for Western MNCs in a culture that relies heavily on
guanxi. Western multinationals, which run with strict policies on gifts and
hospitality, may find it difficult to uphold their global compliance codes in China.
The paradoxical cultural acceptance of bribery challenges the efficacy of major anti-
bribery regimes, such as the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and the UK
Bribery Act (BA 2010). The fierce competition for securing business opportunities
in China’s lucrative markets escalates the pressure on those Western MNCs. It has
sparked a long standing debate over whether extraterritorial restrictions on bribery
are viable, or whether the cultural variable will influence the globalisation of anti-
bribery regimes.6 It remains a myth in terms of the extent to which how the Chinese
culture interacts with the anti-bribery globalisation. It is worth exploring whether
the perceived concerns constitute a real challenge and the extent to which the
culture affects the globalisation of anti-bribery legislation and implementation.
This study is in five parts. Section 2 provides an overview of China’s unique legal
culture of guanxi and gift-giving inherent from the nation’s cultural underpinnings
of Confucianism. Arguably, bribery is not rooted in the Chinese culture, rather a
result of rational and economic calculation within context of time and location. It is
an efficient institution that matters, which may account for why China was given
lower ranking in the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI 2015) than those in Hong
Kong and Singapore, despite their sharing similarities in culture. Section 3 discusses
the Amendments made to Article 164 of the PRC Criminal Law which criminalises
bribery beyond China’s borders. Section 4 continues to discuss developments in the
sections of Chinese Criminal Law focused on targeting bribers. The section
continues to look into the far-reaching impact of the Amendments on both foreign
and domestic MNCs. Section 4 provides a critique on the effectiveness of the FCPA
and Bribery Act 2010. Given the intrinsic nature and extrinsic need to build business
1 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 2014).
2 Rose-Ackerman (2010).
3 Nichols (1999c), p 271.
4 Michaels (2013).
5 Stolenberg (2000), p 725.
6 Salbu (1999).
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relations regardless of jurisdictions, the recent Guidance to the two statutes are
examined to ascertain whether statutory deterrence against bribery has been
weakened. The rationales enshrined in the Guidance do not justify the softened
approaches in the jurisdictions of the UK and the US. Section 5 explicates plausible
perceptions of cultural impacts on anti-bribery regimes, and the controversies that
flow from the gap between them. With this pseudo-proposition rebutted, it is instead
proposed that efficient anti-bribery laws can curb corporate offences, without
placing foreign MNCs at a severe competitive disadvantage. Section 6 explores a
viable governance regime under which MNCs may reduce its exposure to criminal
liability. It further examines the extent to which the variable of culture can influence
MNCs’ global compliance programmes, and the feasibility in fostering a
compliance culture against bribery. At stake is the potential to develop global
anti-bribery compliance programmes that are compatible with local legal and
regulatory settings.
2 The Main-Theme of Culture: Guanxi
Perceptions of bribery do not vary much by culture. Confucianism, deeply
embedded in Chinese society, condemns bribery as other civilisations commonly
do.7 The Confucian ideology not only discourages corruption by advocating
integrity and morality, but also stresses the importance of human relationships.8 The
principles of reciprocity and trust espoused in Confucianism are manifest in guanxi,
which implies a continuous exchange of favours.9 These notions determine how a
person should act within a community.10 As Chinese society slides into mercan-
tilism, gift giving has long been a component of business operations.11 Ethical
concerns arise due to an improper application of guanxi, which often leads to
bribery. In this vein, guanxi helps to ascertain the prevalence of the corruption
epidemic, which is intrinsically bound within the cultural norms of Chinese society.
2.1 Guanxi with Unique Chinese Characteristics
China is experiencing a period of transition to a market economy, shifting from a
guanxi predominance to an orientation characterised by the rule of law.12
Nevertheless, guanxi still explicitly exemplifies a continued predominance of act
utilitarianism over the weaker rule utilitarianism in China.13 The art of guanxi is
widely perceived to be a negative phenomenon; the corruption of officialdom in
7 Nichols (1999c).
8 Stolenberg (2000), p 722.
9 Pearce and Xin (1996).
10 Stolenberg (2000).
11 Steidlmeier (1999).
12 Nichols (1999a).
13 Hansen (1992), pp 115–121.
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contemporary Chinese society.14 Across the globe, attitudes towards what exactly
bribery comprises vary. Given the inherent conflict between the socially-embedded
nature of some common practice and legal definitions of bribery, it makes sense to
distinguish culturally appropriate gift giving from outright bribery.
2.1.1 Is Guanxi-Oriented Culture Inherently Wrong?
Guanxi per se has no original sin. It is a deeply embedded system of interpersonal
relationships. As Hamilton observed: ‘Chinese society consists of networks of
people whose actions are oriented by normative social relationships.’15 A pragmatic
theory holds that guanxi is used to build privileged networks to secure potential
advantages; the recipient of a gift obligates themselves to return the favour in the
form of an undefined reciprocal service in the future. Guanxi falls in line with
Confucian benevolence, which expects the recipient to repay favours. It is this
reciprocating dimension that ensures respect of the guanxi obligations within the
network. Guanxi, in this dimension of the Chinese culture, acts as a means to
advance personal interests. Gift-giving can serve as a facilitating scheme in the
guanxi-related context. Apart from the pragmatic perspective, guanxi functions as
an efficient coordination mechanism, which ostensibly lowers transaction costs in a
transitional period characterised by high institutional uncertainty.16 It makes up for
the defectiveness of an incomplete market economy.17 Theoretically, bribery is
inversely proportional to its costs. As the costs associated with corrupt transactions
increase, guanxi gradually reduces in importance, and incidences of bribery should
decline. However, this has not been the case during China’s transition to a market
economy. With central-administrative mechanisms diminishing, new market-
oriented substitutes are emerging placed to effectively govern the transition.18
The growing liberalisation of the Chinese economy demands a well-established
anti-bribery regime, which can provide legal certainty, and thus steadily eliminate
reliance on guanxi to safeguard transactions. The mere institutionalisation of
sophisticated laws does not displace the reliance on guanxi in the short term. There
should be a common consensus among businesses that regulatory regimes perform
more effectively than guanxi, before they could be viewed as preferable in
regulating their transactions.19
2.1.2 Pluralistic Attitudes towards Bribery-The Cultural Tolerance of Bribery
in China
Guanxi-based bribery has been increasingly common in contemporary Chinese
society. As a form of significant social capital, guanxi is cultivated over time based
14 Yang (1994), pp 56–62.
15 Hamilton (2006), p 45.
16 Schramm and Taube (2003).
17 Zhan (2012).
18 Posner (1980).
19 Richardson and Tepikina (2014).
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on trust and reciprocity, which may facilitate binding bribery.20 The cultural
tolerance of corruption may partly account for the complexity of anti-bribery efforts
in China. Firstly, sentiments of moral repugnance and censure towards corruption
are not so prevalent in China as in Western countries.21 Chinese culture indicates
that people’s social status rests overwhelmingly with their wealth, which
incentivises people to pursue even illicit gains at any expense. Bribery per se
serves as a symptom of both opportunity and lack of restraint. The restraints on such
activities have eroded as China’s guiding ideology has shifted from one of social
purification to one of overwhelming materialism.22 Such a perception affects the
public’s attitude towards corruption. Secondly, sensitivity to culture in China leads
to tolerance of certain actions that may be labelled as bribery under the BA 2010
and the FCPA.23 Gift giving is fundamental to the entrenched practice of developing
guanxi and plays a delicate role in securing a potential business.24 Gifts foster a
sense of indebtedness.25 A common form of quid pro quo relational expectations is
evinced via tacit understanding. As a result, bribery is plausibly accepted as valid
means in conducting business, running rampant throughout China. Guanxi is often
abused to advance the interests of firms at the price of distorting the commercial
culture.26 It was indicated that 94.2% of participants prosecuted for bribe-giving
said that they would warm up relations with guanxi prior to conducting bribery.27
For this reason, culturally-competent MNCs should become aware of its ethical and
legal ramifications. Furthermore, cultural differences render it difficult to distin-
guish between actionable and acceptable behaviour,28 blurring the line between
regular transactions and bribery in the current hybrid system. The issue arises as to
where the line should be drawn.29 Noonan suggests that:
a gift is given in a context created by personal relations to convey a personal
feeling and concluding that a gift-giver does not give by way of compensation
or by way of purchase.30
It depends largely on whether a reasonable person would regard a gift as unduly
extravagant in particular circumstances.31 Within Chinese culture, there are moral
parameters in distinguishing regular gift-giving from bribery, based on ‘intentions,
20 Hsu (2005).
21 Li (2011).
22 Stolenberg (2000).
23 Rose-Ackerman (2010).
24 Smart and Hsu (2007).
25 Marcoux (2009).
26 Silver-Greenberg and Protess (2013).
27 Li (2011).
28 Salbu (1999), pp 240–241.
29 Ibid., at p 250.
30 Noonan (1984), p 695.
31 Security Exchange Commission (SEC) and Department of Justice (DoJ), A Resource Guide to the US
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (14 November 2012), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-
fraud/legacy/2015/01/16/guide.pdf, pp 15–18 (‘FCPA Guidance’).
The Culture Variable Vis-à-Vis Anti-bribery Law: A Grey… 187
123
purpose, means, and the result’.32 These ideological differences in value and
western ethnocentric prejudice often lead to the assumption that China does not
regard the act of bribery as shameful in the way Westerners regard it.33 Guthrie
raised a counterargument refuting this presumption that:
powerful economic actors often pay increasing attention to the laws, rules and
regulations that are part of the emerging rational-legal system which is being
constructed by the Chinese state.34
Chinese culture has steadily taken on a new lens, aligned with a more Western
view on bribery. Never before in China has the practice of gift-giving come under
such stringent scrutiny. Foreign MNCs’ policy against bribery must apply the same
in China, despite different presuppositions.
2.2 Counterargument: Bribery is the Result of a Rational and Economic
Calculation
Bribery is not simply cultural but also rests upon cost and benefit calculations,
which are made by those who believe that the potential gains sufficiently outweigh
any possible penalty. MNCs will pay bribes unless the potential rewards are trivial
and the risks disproportionately substantial. As rational calculators, they apply a
cost–benefit analysis when deciding whether to engage in bribery, which occurs
only where the anticipated illicit gains exceed the anticipated costs of penalty. Judge
Richard Posner once stated that: ‘the primary function of law, in an economic
perspective, is to alter incentives.’35 One way to deter bribery is to mitigate the
incentives of the briber by stripping away their potential gains.36 Theoretically,
penalties can enhance their deterrent force by depriving bribers of their incentives in
engaging with bribery. An optimal deterrent penalty scheme would set the level of
punishment at the level of the marginal cost of bribery.37 It can be achieved by
making bribery too costly to conduct.38 After all, marginal benefits increase as the
probability of preventing a case of bribery falls. Without the genuine threat of
criminal liability, MNCs have little incentive to comply with law when the fines
imposed make up a fraction of the potential illicit gains procured through bribery.
2.3 The Dialectical Analysis of Guanxi in Comparison: The Institutional
Void
It is an institutional void that contributes primarily to prevalent bribery in China.
Corruption is pervasive with tentacles reaching into every arena of Chinese
32 Andrulis et al. (1994), p 218.
33 Wallace-Bruce (2000).
34 Guthrie (1998), p 255.
35 Posner (2007), p 266.
36 Ibid.
37 Weiss (2009).
38 Stevenson and Wagoner (2011), p 793.
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society.39 Because of the culture of gift-giving, the Chinese have been accused of
being promiscuously corrupt in their business practices.40 The cause of bribery is
not the culture of a society, but rather the result of institutional void, which
contributes mainly to China’s ranking as 83rd out of the 168 countries on the CPI.41
In addition, China was ranked the 27th of 28 world’s largest economies in the Bribe
Payers Index, which indicates that Chinese companies are the most likely to offer
bribes when doing business abroad.42 Nevertheless, the Chinese diaspora does not
exhibit similar degrees of corruption in the diverse range of countries they reside in.
In the CPI 2015, Hong Kong was ranked 18th and Singapore even higher as the 8th
out of 168 countries.43 According to the Ease of Doing Business Index 2015,
Singapore was ranked the first, Hong Kong the third and China the 90th out of 189
countries.44 These results are consistent with corresponding CPI rankings. It also
shows that Singapore and Hong Kong are among the least corrupt cohorts, while
China (83rd) is among the more corrupt in the world. A myriad of factors has driven
the intensification of bribery in China, of which it is the weakness of institutions that
constitutes an inherently fundamental element. The gap can be attributed to the fact
that corruption is firmly rooted in China’s institutional foundations,45 although it
could be argued that Singapore and HK may have become less corrupt because of
their colonial histories.
Even the most prudent anti-bribery provisions may not reduce corruption where
bribery represents the routine ways of doing business. However, law equipped with
rigorous institutions are capable of transforming culturally constructed practices.46
The three jurisdictions share similar cultural values, but there are dramatic
differences between their institutions. In addition, these differences suggest that
culture plays a less significant role in contributing to the CPI rankings. Guanxi is
perceived as a negative activity linked inextricably with bribery practices. However,
they are not necessarily directly linked. Guanxi only transitions into bribery when
the exchange taking place involves corrupt intent. Whilst culture could represent an
obstacle to fighting bribery, cultural pluralism is not an excuse to undermine efforts
in tackling bribery extraterritorially. The Chinese economy is more robust than
before, its culture has growing significant global implications and corresponding
cultural values exert influence outside of China. Such repercussions will be limited
when both foreign MNCs and their Chinese counterparts operate on a level playing
field, which can be ensured through rule-based institutional restraint. Assuming that
39 Wan (2012).
40 Steidlmeier (1999).
41 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2015, https://www.transparency.org/
cpi2015/#results-table.
42 Transparency International, Bribe Payers Index Report 2011, http://www.transparency.org/bpi2011/
results.
43 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2015, https://www.transparency.org/
cpi2015/#results-table.
44 World Bank (2015), p 4.
45 Salbu (2000).
46 Salbu (1999).
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the anti-bribery institutional change is path dependent, China needs to build more
effective institutions, as these have a significant influence on culture.47 At stake is
the potential to ensure that the behaviour and attitudes of those in power are subject
to stringent law and genuine threat of punishment when involved in bribery.
Although cultural transformation takes time, institution building may act as a
catalyst for changes in cultural norms. It is worth undertaking extrinsic analysis of
the process of cultural change and its implications for anti-bribery regimes in the
three major jurisdictions.
3 The Catching-up of the Anti-bribery Law in China: The Amendments
There is increasingly a global trend towards the strengthening of existing anti-
bribery regimes. Cultural change being incremental, institutional globalisation in
anti-bribery laws can minimise the negative and accentuate the positive.48 Albeit
restrained by the traditions of culture, Chinese institutional development has shown
growth in its sophisticated anti-bribery laws, which are not confined to domestic
bribery. The law prohibits not only Chinese officials from soliciting bribes, but also
the offering of bribes to government functionaries. If violated, legal entities will be
subject to fines.49 Another milestone in legislation is that China has begun to catch
up with its Western counterparts in criminalising bribery to foreign officials. In
2011, China took a key step, enacting legislation that criminalises paying bribes to
foreign government officials for the purpose of seeking illegitimate commercial
benefit.50 The intention of the Amendments is to create legislation similar to the
FCPA and the UK Bribery Act. Being geopolitically constructive, Article 164 has
been becoming a source of systemic risk for multinational corporations.51 The law’s
extraterritorial effect pressures them to take more proactive steps to prevent foreign
bribery.
3.1 The Amended Article 164 of Chinese Criminal Law (CCL 2011)
China has adopted domestic legislation criminalising corrupt foreign business
practices in line with those key multilateral treaties that set global anti-bribery
standards. The Amendments in Article 164 creates a legal avenue to ensure full
compliance with the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD Convention). With the
upgrade of the provisions, China’s anti-bribery law complies with comparable texts
47 Schramm and Taube (2003), pp 271–296.
48 Davis (2010), p 283.
49 PRC Criminal Law (中华人民共和国刑法 zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa) Arts. 385, 389, 391,
393.
50 The Eighth Amendment to the Criminal Law (中华人民共和国刑法修正案 (八)) was adopted by the
Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) on 25 February 2011, which came
into force on 1 May 2011.
51 Gartland (2014).
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issued by signatory members of the OECD.52 Broadening the efforts beyond its own
borders, the Amendment criminalises the providing of ‘money or property to any
foreign party performing official duties or an official of international public
organisations’ for the purpose of ‘seeking illegitimate business benefits’.53 Prior to
this Amendment, the CCL did not have extraterritorial effect. The Amendment
marks the first time in which the law addresses bribery of foreign officials. It also
represents an integral part of China’s effort to conform to the United Nations
Convention against Corruption (UN Convention), to which China is a signatory.54
Chinese MNCs are thus pushed to abide by strict domestic laws and those abroad.
Enforcement is not as robust compared to those under the FCPA and the BA 2010,
explaining the shortfall in why there have been no prosecutions so far under the
Amended Article 164. After all, deterrence is only achievable through credible
threat. The absence of a genuine threat of criminal liability may give Chinese MNCs
an advantage over their counterparts in the global marketplace.
Generally, Chinese anti-bribery laws tend to lack specificity as to the elements
that constitute a violation.55 Article 164, which contains a great deal of uncertainty,
leaves much room for the exercise of discretion in enforcement. It does not carve
out any affirmative defences or exceptions, such as facilitation payments under the
FCPA or the ‘adequate procedures defence’ under the BA 2010. Justifiable as it is
under the FCPA, making facilitation payment in China would still be actionable.
The Chinese authorities thus have broad latitude in prosecuting potential violations.
The vagueness may allow for inconsistent and at times politically motivated
enforcement.56 In fact, where Chinese MNCs are already subject to the BA 2010 or
the FCPA, due to their activities in the UK or their status as foreign issuers in the US
given the increased cross-border transactions, there could be a scenario where the
same set of facts that causes a violation of Article 164 can also constitute a violation
of the FCPA and the BA 2010, and vice versa. The transnational interaction has
resulted in a number of exposures initiated by FCPA investigations in the first
instance. Previously, China has generally not taken action even after investigations
initiated by other countries with respect to bribery in China have been disclosed. It
is argued that the Eighth Amendment is rather more of symbolic importance, since
the new provision fails to encompass the full range of conduct intended to trigger
criminal liability under the UN Convention against Corruption Article 16. It is,
however, a significant step in its gradual approach to fighting transnational bribery.
The Amendment empowers the Chinese authorities to exercise greater vigilance in
monitoring the overseas activities of China’s MNCs. It is still at an early stage, but
reflective of China’s intention to apply the Amendment against foreign bribery.
52 OECD, Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Ofﬁcials in International Business
Transactions 2011, http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf.
53 CCL 2011 Art. 164(2); the 8th Amendment took effect on 1 May 2011.
54 China signed the UN Convention on 10 December 2003 and ratified it on 13 January 2006, https://
www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html.
55 Wombolt and Galvin (2012).
56 ‘Strong Arm of the Law: China’s Commercial Corruption Laws Are Undermined by Politically Driven
Enforcement’, China Economic Review (13 July 2012).
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Furthermore, the provision’s expanded scope is significant in light of the
increasingly aggressive application of extraterritorial jurisdiction over bribery
under the FCPA and the BA 2010. In consequence, compliance with the two anti-
bribery laws does not necessarily ensure compliance with the provision under CCL
2011. This complicates MNCs’ efforts to structure their compliance, in a way that
does not violate Chinese anti-bribery laws. The multinationals must take this
uncertainty into account when determining the level of litigation risk posed by the
Amendment. As such, the Eighth Amendment should, in principle, improve Chinese
MNCs’ ethical standards and help to level the playing field in overseas markets.
3.2 The Ninth Amendment to the Chinese Criminal Law (CCL 2015)
In order to justify its legitimacy in power, the Chinese government is increasingly
determined to change the long-standing culture of graft and backhanders. The Ninth
Amendment to the PRC Criminal Law came into effect on 1 November 2015.57
Previous legal regimes generally targeted only officials who accept bribes.58 The
Ninth Amendment revised several anti-bribery provisions, mainly to impose harsher
punishment on offenders who provide bribes. This approach reinforces and
broadens the scope of compliance with the UN Convention against Corruption.59 In
particular, the Ninth Amendment echoes Article 21 of the UN Convention, which
covers both active and passive bribery. It imposes additional grounds of liability as
well as harsher penalties for bribery offences, which represents China’s escalating
effort in fighting bribery. The Amendment differs from the FCPA in that the latter
aspires to ‘concentrate on the supply side by targeting the MNCs that offer bribes to
government officials’.60
The criminal threshold was set at ¥RMB 200,000 (£20,000) where a bribe is paid
by entities.61 However, an accurate interpretation to certain criteria remains
overwhelmingly challenging in judges’ discretion. Among other things, these
include how to apply punishment based on criteria such as ‘serious circumstances’,
‘extremely serious circumstances’ and ‘significant loss of national interests’ as
outlined in the Ninth Amendment. Noteworthy is a judicial interpretation for the
Handling of Criminal Cases of Embezzlement and Bribery in 2016.62 The legally-
binding decree not only clarifies thresholds, but also specifies what it means in
57 The National People’s Congress of China promulgated the 9th Amendment to the Criminal Law (中华
人民共和国刑法修正案 (九)) on 29 August 2015.
58 The FCPA does not provide a mechanism to prosecute foreign officials for receiving bribes,
presumably for reasons of international comity. Unlike the FCPA, the Bribery Act criminalizes the receipt
of bribes, in addition to the payment of bribes.
59 UN Convention covers ‘Bribery of national public officials (Article 1)’; Bribery of foreign public
officials and officials of public international organisations (Art. 16); and Bribery in the private sector (Art.
21).
60 Warin et al. (2010a), p 41.
61 CCL Art. 393.
62 The judicial interpretation (最高人民法院、最高人民检察院关于办理贪污贿赂刑事案件适用法律
若干问题的解释) was jointly issued by the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s
Procuratorate on 18 April 2016.
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judicial practice. Furthermore, it adds a new provision to Article 390, targeting
those giving bribes to a person who may exert influence on a current or former
government official. The Chinese Criminal Procedure Law defines ‘close relatives’
as ‘husband, wife, father, mother, son, daughter, and siblings’.63 there is no
guidance in the Amendment as to who will qualify as a person ‘closely related’ to
the state functionary. A lack of definition may give the authorities broader discretion
and flexibility in prosecuting a bribe-giver.64 Such ‘influential persons’ include
anyone who is closely associated with a current or former government official.65
This Amendment mirrors the approach in US v. Liebo, where it was found to be
illegal to corruptly influence a foreign official indirectly.66 It represents a further
effort to prevent government officials from receiving bribes through their inner
circle, regardless of whether it happens during their government service or ex post.67
Corporate compliance due diligence should broaden payee background checks to
‘red flag’ not only current and former government officials, but also any of their
close associates to prevent such a delicate violation. The provision tries to resolve
an inherent problem in the practice where bribers were penalised far less harshly
than were the bribees. This disparity was based on an assumption that the former is
often a reluctant participant in bribery. However, bribers and bribees are often
interdependent on each other.
Finally, a Joint Interpretation provides potential credit for self-disclosure or
otherwise confessing wrongdoing in respect of the policy of leniency.68 Under the
Ninth CCL Amendment (CCL 2015), an offender who self-reports before the
commencement of a prosecution will only be eligible for an exemption of
punishment under particular circumstances. For instance, the offense was relatively
minor or the accused has provided information to authorities leading to the
‘successful investigation of a major case’.69 Other than these special circumstances,
the criminal penalties to be imposed on offenders who self-disclose will only be
mitigated but not eliminated.70 The Ninth Amendment substantially limits the
circumstances under which a confessing bribe offeror may be exempted from
criminal liability. Tightening the restrictions on immunity represents a major shift
63 Criminal Procedure Law 2012 (中华人民共和国刑事诉讼法 zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi
susongfa) Art. 106 (6).
64 Tan and Wang (2015).
65 CCL 2015 Art. 46.
66 United States v. Liebo, 923 F.2d 1308, 1311 (8th Cir. 1991); FCPA Guidance, p 16.
67 The Ninth Amendment of CCL 2015 Art. 390.
68 China’s Supreme People’s Court (SPC) and Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP) issued a Joint
Interpretation to apply anti-bribery laws on 26 December 2012. Interpretation of the Supreme People’s
Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate of Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law for
Handling Criminal Cases of Bribery 最高人民法院、最高人民检察院关于办理行贿刑事案件具体应
用法律若干问题的解释 (SPC and SPP Joint Judicial Interpretation). The Joint Interpretation was
adopted at the 1547th Meeting of the Judicial Committee of the Supreme People’s Court on 14 May 2012
and the 77th meeting of the 11th Procuratorial Committee of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate on 21
August 2012. It took effect on 1 January 2013. Matthews (2013). SPC and SPP Joint Judicial
Interpretation Arts. 7–9.
69 CCL 2015 Art. 45.
70 CCL 2015 Art. 45.
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from the pre-Amendment legal precept that imposes harsher punishments on bribe-
receivers while offering leniency to bribe-givers with the intent to elicit the
cooperation.71 This change means increased risks to MNCs, as once a bribery case is
escalated to criminal prosecution, it will be unlikely for the firm to escape criminal
penalties. At this initial stage of the anti-bribery transformation, it all comes down
to the key point of how China can devote substantial resources to ensure that the
Amendments are effectively enforced.
3.3 The Impact on MNCs’ Global Compliance Strategies
China’s anti-corruption landscape has become more stringent than ever with the
above Amendments. The approaches bring China’s statutory enforcement authority
standards to levels among the world’s toughest anti-bribery laws, which stand aloof
from the traditional Chinese culture of gift-giving. The updating of the Chinese
Criminal Law represents a positive step, given China’s growing role in the global
market. The global anti-bribery regimes have thus been reinforced with China
moving forward on the recent Amendments. Enforcement of China’s new law
would send a strong message that China is assuming a position of global leadership
consistent with both its commitment to rule of law and its stature as the second
largest economy in the world. Given the general lack of affirmative defences or
exceptions, the Amendments seek to impose harsher penalties than those under the
FCPA and the BA 2010, which target mainly on the supply side of the bribery. As
such, MNCs should proactively review and ensure that their due diligence and
stringent compliance programmes rise to this new challenge. They need to reassess
their existing internal control procedures to ensure even their subsidiaries are
protected adequately. Both the FCPA and the BA 2010 require those MNCs to be
relatively certain that no bribery is taking place with Chinese subsidiaries and their
supply chains. MNCs subject to investigations by UK or US regulators should
operate conforming to global resolutions, including those created by Chinese anti-
bribery authorities.
Plausibly, it still remains unclear whether the stringent Amendments could
meaningfully change the scenario between the anti-bribery institutions and the long-
standing culture with particular regard to gift-giving. The Eighth Amendment
provides a macro framework outlawing bribery of foreign officials, while the Ninth
one on a more micro level entails constructive constraints on the briber who likely
gives in the name of gift-giving. It is essential to ascertain the extent to which the
divergent statutory approaches by the three jurisdictions respectively impose on the
intersection of culture and anti-bribery endeavours. More specifically, it is argued
that gift-giving and guanxi-building are not unique in China, while the institution
matters via the anti-bribery law in terms of the essence of these universal social
phenomena. Some specific provisions under the FCPA and the BA 2010 provide
delicate leverage in response to the hypothesis.
71 Tan and Wang (2015).
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4 Are Anti-Bribery Watered Down under the FCPA and the BA 2010?
It is vital to be aware of the legal scenarios of the gift-giving and hospitality culture
between major jurisdictions, as they are at stake in achieving the globalisation of
anti-bribery law on the one hand, and facilitating MNCs’ global compliance on the
other. In theory, any gift or hospitality will potentially trigger liability, where it is
provided with the intention of inducing the recipient to act improperly. The UK
Bribery Act 2010 creates a tougher framework for prosecution than applies under
the FCPA. It remains to be seen whether the recent Guidance undermines the global
efforts to tackle bribery, or makes the implementation slide into more common-
sense practices.
4.1 The Controversial Exception of Facilitation Payments and Hospitality
The Security Exchange Commission (SEC) and Department of Justice (DoJ) rely on
a broad interpretation of ‘anything of value’ when justifying the criminalization of a
variety of corporate hospitality and gift-giving customs.72 Certain expenses can be
considered as affirmative defence for the sake of promoting business.73 While
illegal under the BA 2010, the facilitation payment remains lawful under the
FCPA.74 An exception provision permits payment to foreign officials to expedite
securing the performance of a routine governmental action.75 It is not seen as a
pragmatic solution labelled with bribery. Small payments made to expedite a
foreign official’s routine service are often seen as a more efficient solution, or a
necessary evil within a society where such actions are a common lubricant.76 There
is no universally accepted definition of what constitutes a permissible facilitation
payment. Like the interplay between guanxi and bribery, the line is often blurred
between an illegal bribe and a facilitation payment. The court decides how the
exception provision is interpreted in particular circumstances, where the foreign
official does not exercise any discretion. Whilst payments of such kind may drive
the officials to expedite their duties, the payments per se are corrosive in nature.77
The recipient junior official may not have a final decision, which roles still
constitute an integral part of the decision-making process. As Transparency
International observed:
Paying small bribes feeds a culture of corruption which creates an
unstable operating environment for companies. They should be seen as a
72 The Securities and Exchange Commission, Litigation Release No. 21770, 10 December 2010.
Securities and Exchange Commission v. RAE Systems Inc. Civil Action No. 1:10-cv-02093 (D.D.C.,
December 10, 2010).
73 15 USC §§ 78dd-1(c) (2), 78dd-2(c) (2).
74 Windsor and Getz (2000), p 748.
75 15 USC §§ 78dd-1(b) and (f)(3); Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 s. 30A.
76 Carling, Paasche and Siegel (2015).
77 OECD, Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Ofﬁcials in
International Business Transactions (26 November 2009) Art. 6, http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/
ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf.
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part of a cycle of bribery that corrodes public and business standards and
provides a climate for much larger public sector bribery.78
Hospitality must be bona fide and transparent for the sake of enhancing
safeguarding procedures. In practice, the frontier is uncertain between a bona fide
business expenditure and a bribe. Although it is said that a lavish one could trigger
FCPA liability, the difficulty is to distinguish when hospitality is seen as an
improper inducement to seek business. Furthermore, it should never be seen as a
viable safe harbour when used for foreign MNCs to build guanxi in China, since it
has always been narrowly construed.79 Neither Chinese culture nor anti-bribery law
yields explicit solutions to this controversy. The facilitation payment is not only in
contrast to the BA 2010 under which it is forbidden, but also inconsistent with the
OECD Convention.80 In order to level the playing field, facilitation payments should
be abolished.
4.2 The Ministry of Justice Guideline of Bribery Act 2010
The UK Bribery Act (BA 2010) prohibits bribery of a foreign public official in order
to secure an advantage in the conduct of business.81 However, Guidance issued by
the UK Ministry of Justice complicates compliance efforts and leads to inconsis-
tency in discharging the policies of legitimate business expenses.82 A non-
systematic payment would not necessarily be illegal.83 Some contextual consider-
ations resolve around the varying cultural settings under which certain payments,
such as gift-giving, may not constitute bribery. The existence of corrupt intent then
rests within several factors, such as the nature, value and transparency of the deal.
4.2.1 The World’s ‘Toughest’ Anti-bribery Law?
The Bribery Act 2010 is tougher and broader in scope than the FCPA. A firm can be
prosecuted for failing to prevent bribery regardless of the knowledge or intent of its
management. Corporations face unlimited fines for violations of the Act.84
Previously, senior executives were considered to be the directing mind and
controlling will of a company for the purposes of establishing an offence.85 The BA
2010 creates a new strict liability offense for failing to take preventative steps
78 Transparency International, Countering Small Bribes (June 2014), http://www.transparency.org.uk/
publications/countering-small-bribes/.
79 Warin et al. (2010a), p 63.
80 UK Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act 2010 Guidance §§ 44–47, http://www.justice.gov.uk/
downloads/legislation/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf, p 18 (‘Bribery Act 2010 Guidance’).
81 BA 2010 s. 6.
82 BA 2010 s. 9(1): the UK Ministry of Justice published a guidance on 14 September 2010 required by
the provision.
83 FCPA Guidance, p 15.
84 BA 2010 s. 11.
85 Yarosky (1964).
196 Q. Bu
123
against bribery, subject to a defence of adequate procedures86 This provision
renders the prosecution of corporations easier and avoids the prosecutorial pitfalls of
the directing mind doctrine. The statute also applies extraterritorially to any
company with links to the UK, irrespective of where the crime occurs.87 Provided
that a Chinese MNC carries on a business or part of a business in British territories,
the UK courts can exercise jurisdiction.88 With the advent of the BA 2010 and its
extraterritorial reach, it is important for foreign MNCs entering the Chinese market
to bear these cultural traits in mind when rolling out an anti-bribery compliance
programme. The ‘adequate procedures’ can be deployed as the only affirmative
defence, that is, the defendant can show that they had adequate anti-bribery
compliance procedures in place.89
4.2.2 The Inconsistency under the Bribery Act 2010 Guidance
Bribes are often disguised as legitimate business expenditure.90 Although a
reasonable gift or hospitality is unlikely to be penalised, it is difficult to explicitly
quantify, given the blurred line between a legitimate expenditure and an unlawful
bribe. The Guidance to the BA 2010 creates loopholes for bribery to go unchecked,
stating that:
[p]roviding flights, accommodation and reasonable hospitality for a foreign
official and their spouse to visit New York to meet senior UK executives
would be unlikely to breach the law.91
It indicates that the Bribery Act 2010 should be implemented in a common sense
manner.92 The Serious Fraud Office (SFO) seems to take a proportionate approach
and would only prosecute where there was evidence of systematic bribery rather
than a one-off payment.93 The burden of proof, however, remains with the company.
Rational as it appears, enforcement agencies have been conferred broad discretion
to interpret the line under which some grease payments are actionable. The
Guidance creates significant exemptions that directly contradict the spirit of the
Bribery Act.94 The exemptions create artificial distinctions that are
86 BA 2010 s. 7.
87 BA 2010 s. 12(5).
88 BA 2010 s. 7.
89 BA 2010 s. 7(2).
90 Serious Fraud Office (SFO) (2012).
91 Bribery Act 2010 Guidance § 31, p 14.
92 Bribery Act 2010 Guidance § 36.
93 Bond Anti-Corruption Group submission to the Cabinet Office Enforcement Review on the Guidance
to the Bribery Act (30 July 2015), http://www.cw-uk.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/BOND-Anti-
Corruption-Group-submission-on-Bribery-Act-Guidance-Review-July-2015.pdf.
94 UK Parliament HC 847 International Development Committee, ‘Written Evidence from Christian Aid’
(27 April 2011), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmintdev/847/847vw06.
htm.
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difficult to enforce, undermine corporate anti-bribery procedures, confuse anti-
bribery communication with employees and other associated persons, and
perpetuate an existing ‘culture’ of bribery and have the potential to be
abused.95
The Guidance even provides that companies that only indirectly benefit from
bribery are unlikely to be held culpable.96 It is worrying that the Guidance would
allow MNCs to escape liability by outsourcing bribery to subsidiaries or
subcontractors.97
4.3 Soften the Anti-Bribery Efforts
It remains unclear whether there are substantive differences between Western
facilitation payments and the prevalent gift-giving practice in China. The latter is
readily seen as a catalyst of bribery in China, while the former is lawful under the
FCPA, though unlawful under the BA 2010. Guanxi is widely perceived by the West
as a sordid form of favouritism and nepotism.98 According to the Guidance/
Guidelines to the two major anti-bribery laws, certain business expenditures, like
reasonable hospitality are not considered bribery. To understand the rationale
behind the delicate distinction may help MNCs be alert to potential pitfalls across
jurisdictions.
4.3.1 A Classical Preposition: The Chinese Guanxi Vis-à-Vis The Western Network
Gift-giving manifests, to some degree, favours that are not uniquely a Chinese
phenomenon. Pervasive corruption reinforces a negative perception of guanxi. With
corruption being endemic in China, gift-giving is not to blame since it represents
only part of the wider landscape of guanxi. There is little difference between guanxi
and Western networking practices. Guanxi is hard to interpret precisely. Favours can
be regarded as the ultimate carrier of guanxi, which are typically of a more personal
nature than those performed in Western networking.99As a means of expressing
respect and honour, gift giving shows that a relationship is valued. It expresses good
will and gratitude, which is considered a dynamic form of social contracting.100 The
concept of guanxi overlaps, to a large degree, with the Western concept of
networking. For this reason, it is not justified to differentiate these two social
phenomena extensively. As stated in the Guide to the FCPA, giving a small gift is
an appropriate way for business people to display respect for each other.101
95 Bribery Act 2010 Guidance § 45, p 19.
96 Bribery Act 2010 Guidance §§ 40–42.
97 UK Parliament HC 847 International Development Committee, ‘Written Evidence from Tearfund and
CAFOD’ (27 April 2011), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmintdev/847/
847vw10.htm; Bribery Act 2010 Guidance § 39.
98 Yeung and Tung (1996).
99 Michailova and Worm (2003), p 510.
100 OECD (1998), p 8.
101 FCPA Guidance, p 15.
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Similarly, the FCPA does not prohibit gift-giving, but only illegitimate bribes
disguised as a gift.102 By means of reduction to absurdity, one of the Transparency
International comments indirectly proves the negligible difference between the two,
proposing that: ‘small companies are far more vulnerable to corruption since they
often do not have the connections to bypass individual officials’.103
Typically, an individual offers a gift in their guanxi network for an indefinite
return, whilst their Western counterparts expect a prompt return following the
facilitation payment. The latter is, in substance, not a guanxi-related giving, but
targets particularly the recipient’s routine performance. The use of facilitation
payments is one of the methods to build a pragmatic and instant guanxi. Some
commentators have echoed such a discourse, stating that: ‘the US society has a
tradition which pursues specificity and decisiveness’.104 Both guanxi and Western
networking share similar underlying cultural implications of a moral and ethical
indebtedness. Some differences manifest themselves in more psychological rather
than substantive perspectives. From a legal perspective, the only plausible
difference appears to be that the gift-giving in the West has been sophisticatedly
institutionalised. Guanxi stands as an informal antagonistic relationship to the
formal Western system of legal rights.105 In the West, some pre-existing institutions
produce relatively clear jurisdictional lines. As such, a prerequisite to establish
criminal liability rests with a sufficient causal link between the advantage/bribe and
the intention to influence,106 whereas within a guanxi network, the influence could
take shape long after the gift-giving. Chinese institutions, to some extent, do not
reside in jurisdictions, but within relationships. Although gift-giving is explicitly
regulated even in Chinese codified law, it has never been robustly enforced. This
contradiction promotes the perception that gift-giving constitutes a part of the
Chinese culture uniquely, or at least, it differs substantively from that in the West.
4.3.2 Global Anti-Bribery Efforts Diluted Under the Guidance
The Guidance to BA 2010 creates a new venue through which MNCs are virtually
not prohibited from making facilitation payments, provided they are proved to be
made reasonably and proportionately.107 Multinationals may now have, in
substance, a new defence to Sect. 7 offence apart from the classical one of
‘adequate procedures’.108 The de facto defence of ‘reasonable and proportionate
hospitality’ along with the de jure defence of ‘adequate procedures’ are equivalent
to certain FCPA’s provisions. Neither the BA 2010 nor the FCPA set thresholds for
expenses in gifts and hospitality. The BA 2010 expects companies to adopt a ‘zero
102 FCPA Guidance, p 16.
103 ‘When a Bribe is Merely Facilitating Business’, The Economist (1 June 2011).
104 Lin and Malhotra (2012), p 121.
105 Hamilton (1994).
106 Bribery Act 2010 Guidance § 28, p 13.
107 Torres-Fowler and Anderson (2011).
108 BA 2010 s. 7(2); the only defence available under BA 2010 is to demonstrate that the company had
‘adequate procedures’ designed to prevent persons associated with it from undertaking bribery.
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tolerance’ policy towards such expenditures.109 The Guidance provides high-risk
examples of acceptable hospitality. These approaches demonstrate an attempt to
soften the BA 2010s position on some tough tenets. On the other hand, the Guidance
does not have the force of law. It helps explain what kind of procedures it regards as
likely to be adequate under Sect. 7. Ultimately it will be for the courts to exercise its
discretion. In this regard, it remains to be seen whether Guidance will alter the
future prosecution landscape. In respect to rapidly changing global regulations and
needs, a well advised policy for MNCs is to adopt a no-bribes policy and rigorously
enforce it throughout their global operations. A corporate culture with a
commitment to integrity providing ‘tone-from-the-top’ is also critical to imple-
menting a programme to counter potentially liable practices, such as gift-giving and
hospitality expenditure.
5 A Pseudo-proposition: The Argument of an Unlevelled Playing Field
The international community has endeavoured to create a level playing field in order
to combat bribery beyond their own territories. Despite a growing number of FCPA
prosecutions against foreign MNCs, it is perceived that the Chinese MNCs are not
subject to similar stringent anti-bribery laws. Chinese firms may not have to bear the
costs of additional due diligence and scrutiny under the FCPA or the BA 2010. With
increasing convergence of the global anti-bribery regimes, uneven law enforcement
will undercut the aim of the OECD Convention to harmonise international anti-
bribery standards. This may plausibly harm those in high-enforcement nations.
Paradoxically, the unlevelled playing field may create a systematic risk that could
prevent those Western MNCs from securing businesses while competing with their
Chinese counterparts. It is however, noteworthy that both US and UK authorities
have increased their prosecution of foreign entities. A long-standing debate centres
on whether the BA 2010 and the FCPA genuinely place British and American
businesses at a real disadvantage.
5.1 Are American and British Corporations Genuinely Disadvantaged?
Would the FCPA and the BA 2010 enforcement counterproductively chill business
by discouraging corporate entry into the Chinese market? Arguably, widespread
corruption in China could put foreign MNCs between the proverbial rock and a hard
place.110 The statutes are conceived to make Western MNCs less competitive due to
the uneven enforcement of law. Hypothetically, the foreign MNCs then incur a
competitive disadvantage against their counterparts in China, where anti-bribery
laws are not enforced as rigorously as in the US and the UK.111 The resultant
asymmetrical market opportunities limit the ability of foreign MNCs to compete in
China. Nevertheless, some statistics provide empirical evidence to the contrary.
109 Warin et al. (2010b), p 21.
110 Norton (2006), p 22.
111 Pedersen (2008).
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5.1.1 Empirical Evidence
The MNC’s home state laws cannot completely reach transnational bribery, and the
host state’s legal framework is therefore required for effective control.112 In 2011,
72% of the financial penalties in FCPA cases were assessed by US authorities
against non-US companies, even though these companies comprised only 41% of
those investigated.113 From 2009 to 2011, 16 of the 36 FCPA enforcement cases
have involved non-US parent companies.114 Nine of the ten largest penalties until
2011 imposed by US authorities for alleged FCPA violations were levied against
foreign companies.115 Several of the most high-profile FCPA enforcement actions
of all-time have been against foreign companies, too. Further research puts forward
that 90% of small-and-medium enterprises (SMEs) have had no problems with the
provisions of the UK Bribery Act 2010 and 89% of SMEs felt that the BA 2010 had
no impact on their ability to export.116 In reality, China-based MNCs are faced with
a rapidly evolving domestic anti-bribery compliance environment. They are not
exempt from the FCPA’s and the BA 2010’s reach either. For instance, the FCPA
accounting provisions, require corporations to
(i) make and keep books and records that accurately and fairly reflect the
transactions of the corporation; and
(ii) devise and maintain an adequate system of internal accounting controls.117
Chinese MNCs are jumping to take advantage of the deep capital markets
provided by Western exchanges. Simultaneously, they have been running into the
challenges of complying with the FCPA and the Bribery Act 2010 as well. As some
commentators revealed: ‘nearly one-half of all China-related corporate prosecutions
under the FCPA since 2002 involved the provision of gifts.’118
5.1.2 An Invalidated Pseudo-Proposition
Non sequitur invalidates the above-mentioned argument that the US and UK
corporations are being disadvantaged. Firstly, China has accelerated criminalisation
of paying bribes to foreign officials, mirroring the exterritorial restrictions provided
under both the BA 2010 and the FCPA. Those internationally accepted norms have
been reflected in China’s amended Article 164. Foreign MNCs are to be treated the
112 Nichols (1999c), p 259; Nichols (1999b).
113 US Department of Justice, Related Enforcement Actions, Chronological List 2011, http://www.justice.
gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/2011.html.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid.
116 HM Government, Insight into Awareness and Impact of the Bribery Act 2010—Among Small and
Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs) (2015), pp 37, 38, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/440661/insight-into-awareness-and-impact-of-the-bribery-act-2010.pdf
(accessed 1 September 2017).
117 15 USC § 78m.
118 Warin et al. (2010a), p 59.
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same as their Chinese counterparts, at least, on paper. Secondly, it is perceived that
the UK and US multinationals have been penalised out of either protectionism,
nationalism or selective enforcement. Without solid evidence, such a perception is
only to be viewed as a pseudo-proposition. Lastly, the empirical data mentioned
above proves to be counterintuitive. The fact casts doubt on the tenability of the
arguments, since overwhelmingly more foreign companies than US firms have been
investigated and prosecuted under the FCPA. The anti-bribery efforts have been
taking place in both international as well as domestic fora,119 although the
effectiveness of extraterritorial restrictions on bribery remains to be seen. In order to
create a level playing field, global anti-bribery initiatives have been emerging
toward the development of an avenue to deter transnational bribery. Under the UN
and OECD Conventions, the signatory countries are committed to outlawing
extraterritorial bribes throughout the world.
5.2 International Soft Law in Combating Global Bribery
Extrinsic pressure is imperative to ensure efficacy of a domestic anti-bribery regime.
There is great potential to reduce bribery with external oversight and transparency.
The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Department of Justice (DoJ)
have been seeking to ensure a levelling of the playing field via international avenues
of soft law. The United Nations adopted the Convention against Corruption (UN
Convention) in 2003,120 which requires signatory parties to criminalise bribery of
both national and foreign public officials.121 The OECD Convention Represents
another noteworthy international development, and each signatory nation is pledged
to criminalise foreign bribery.122 It calls on treaty parties to enact legislation making
it a criminal offense to offer bribes to foreign officials ‘in order to obtain or retain
business or other improper advantages in the conduct of international business’.123
The two soft law initiatives pave the way to be the foremost global legal instruments
to fight foreign bribery.124 Like the FCPA, and China’s approach under the previous
CCL, the OECD Convention covers only the active bribery, i.e. the liability of
bribers, excluding the passive bribery.125 The two Conventions have prompted
members to accept international anti-bribery norms and to move toward adopting
norms into their domestic law. The heightened regulatory scrutiny and enforcement
are accordingly evolving into criminalisation of corporate bribery. China’s
accession to the Conventions have dramatically reinforced the integration of its
domestic institutions into the global anti-bribery regimes. The soft law helps to
119 Deming (1999).
120 The UN Convention approved by the Ad Hoc Committee was adopted by the General Assembly by
resolution 58/4 of 31 October 2003, and came into effect in December 2005.
121 The UN Convention against Corruption Arts. 15–16.
122 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions,
18 December 1997, 37 ILM 1.
123 OECD Convention Art. 1.1.
124 OECD (2008), p 3.
125 Ibid., at p 12.
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undermine MNCs’ claims to cultural sensitivity, but these effects can only
complement, not substitute domestic anti-bribery law.126
6 Plausible Cultural Variables Vis-à-Vis Globalised Anti-Bribery
Compliance
Chinese culture influences the way people think, act and hence the extent to which
they should be held responsible for their behaviour. As a double-edged sword, the
culture per se can contribute to illegal behaviour like bribery, while it can also be a
vehicle for promoting good ethical conduct.127 As transactions cross borders,
simultaneously satisfying each of the overlapping anti-bribery laws of multiple
jurisdictions can be challenging. It is never enough to stress the need for a culture of
compliance. This section explores how to tackle bribery through taking preventive
measures and fostering a culture of integrity.
6.1 Make Gift-Giving Policies Jurisdiction Speciﬁc
Conventional wisdom holds that foreign MNCs’ success in China depends to a
certain degree of adapting to Chinese cultural values, while their compliance
regimes tend to reflect the parent companies’ corporate culture and strategic
imperatives.128 One of the primary risks that China’s culture pose to MNCs is that
they could run afoul of the FCPA or the UK Bribery Act. Foreign MNCs may
attempt to defend their bribery in reference to China’s traditions of gift giving. The
claim that bribery exists intrinsically in China’s culture remains a plausible pseudo
proposition, which misleads the MNCs’ global anti-bribery efforts.
Extraterritoriality arguably disregards the values of other cultures, given that gift
policies vary considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.129 What might well
constitute a reasonable gift in China may violate anti-bribery laws in other
jurisdictions. The BA 2010 provides that: ‘any local custom or practice is to be
disregarded unless it is permitted or required by the written law applicable to the
country or territory concerned.’130 Law transforms a culture that tolerates
corruption, while simultaneously the culture triggers a response of enacting more
anti-bribery laws. In this sense, the law is not merely a reflection or by-product of
culture, but can also serve a legitimate constitutive role in forming culture.131 With
more anti-bribery laws with extraterritorial effect, the room for customary gift-
giving practices is shrinking, even though they do not truly constitute bribery.132
Neither Article 164, the FCPA nor the Bribery Act 2010 grants a culture defence, so
126 Rose (2015), pp 15–27.
127 Donaldson (1996).
128 Yang (1999), p 16.
129 Windsor and Getz (2000).
130 BA 2010 s. 5.
131 Mautner (2011); Nichols (1997), p 1271.
132 Fort and Noone (2000).
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it is a challenge for MNCs to ensure that they are upholding the law.133 As such, the
Chinese cultural effect should not be read too widely with the amended Article 164
integrated into the global anti-bribery regime. MNCs should display subcultures and
countercultures in their various overseas operations, instead of behaving in a way
‘when in Rome do as the Romans’.
The concept of guanxi is central to Chinese society and thus heavily influences
corporate behaviour. It is a misconception that a corporate culture of corruption
exists in which bribery is an integral part of doing business. Foreign MNCs are thus
expected to focus increasingly on strengthening their anti-bribery compliance
programmes in China, simply because they are forbidden to pay bribes in both
China and their home states. Foreign MNCs must prohibit bribery despite local
custom.134 The Chinese culture of gift-giving does not justify that Western MNCs
should follow the Chinese way to secure business opportunities. Bribery is normally
disguised in traditional guanxi practices and facilitated by MNCs’ local subsidiaries.
A cultural sensitivity card is sometimes played by foreign MNCs, although it is
often driven by profit motives.135 However, invoking culture as a justification for
making bribes can by no means, be considered as a defence if prosecuted. The
MNCs should in all circumstances respect the value of free market, but not use
China’s culture as an excuse for committing bribery.136 There is substantial
convergence on values about bribery across various cultures. As discussed in
previous sections, condemnation of bribery is a value shared by Confucianism.
Bribery is never justified as a paradoxical reflection of cultural norms. Otherwise,
such plausible sophistry will compromise efforts to produce justice and integrity.137
6.2 The Functional Transformation: A Path-Dependency Resolution
Instances of corruption are at their highest in China where there is a profound
economic or political transformation under way, during which culture does not play
a decisive role.138 It is weak governance that engenders bribery in the transition
from a planned to a market-orientated economy. With corruption spreading into
every corner of society, social and political stability has been threatened.139 Some
Chinese government officials prevalently engage in self-interested corruption and
take advantage of their positions to engage in rent-seeking and solicit MNCs for
bribes. This undermines the state’s claim to legitimacy.140 A number of social,
economic and institutional factors contribute to bribery, of which undeveloped rule
of law and lack of transparency increase the risk. Accordingly, anti-bribery efforts
133 Vega (2009).
134 Stevenson and Wagoner (2011), p 788.
135 Ashe (2005).
136 Rose-Ackerman (2010).
137 Bribery Act 2010 Guidance § 45.
138 Montigny (2015).
139 Johnston and Hao (1995).
140 Rose-Ackerman (2010).
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toward a more transparent and competitive market are one of the key priorities in
China.
6.2.1 The Deep Causes
The rule of law and the market economy have not been fully-fledged in China’s
transition to a market economy.141 First of all, underlying corruption is a growing
tension between the transitional socialist economy and the Chinese traditional
values, which the current unestablished political and institutional frameworks have
failed to handle.142 As Perry noted: ‘advanced economic development may indeed
demand new political arrangements that afford far greater autonomy to legal
institutions and civil society.’143 Secondly, endemic corruption emerges in the times
of economic or political flux because of a non-democratic process.144 Lord Acton
observed that: ‘power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely.’145
In the absence of adequate internal control and external oversight pressure, the
pervasive governmental involvement in China’s transitional economy precipitates
prevalent corruption. Insufficient governance leaves the system open to abuse,
which renders it possible that bribery tends to corrupt the very administrative
systems that are asked to regulate bribery. Finally, China’s export-led growth masks
the macroeconomic costs of corruption. Due to the excessive state intervention and
defective enforcement of anti-bribery laws, the Chinese economic reform has led to
ingrained corruption of the political system.146 The blurred lines between the public
and private spheres provide incentives for rent-seeking and increase susceptibility to
bribery, which creeps in primarily due to a culture of discretionary decision making
by public officials.
6.2.2 A Path-Dependency Resolution
Corruption in China is intensifying and institutionalising.147 It is not necessarily true
that the fewer resources a government controls, the fewer the opportunities there are
for corruption.148 It simply reduces the intrusiveness of governments that makes
bribery less rewarding. If bribery is the result of institutional failures, it will likely
reappear as one group of malefactors is replaced with another.149 The emerging
Chinese anti-bribery regime necessitates increased integration into global systems in
141 Schipani et al. (2016).
142 Richardson and Tepikina (2014).
143 Perry (2007).
144 Montigny (2015).
145 Lord Acton, ‘Letter to Bishop Mandell Creighton, 5 April 1887’, in: J. N. Figgis and R. V. Laurence
(eds.), Historical Essays and Studies (London, Macmillan 1907).
146 Lieberthal (1996).
147 Wedeman (2005), p 920.
148 Chafuen and Guzman (2000), p 51.
149 Rose-Ackerman (2010).
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terms of not only law on paper but also complementary institution building.150 The
current anti-bribery approaches address the symptoms of bribery without tackling
the root causes. Unless there are reforms that establish the rule of law, this approach
only creates an opportunity for someone else to step in and take advantage of the
position. As Rose-Ackerman and Tan noted, structural reforms that reduce corrupt
incentives ought to be the centrepiece.151 Laws against bribery are vital, but they
cannot have a lasting positive impact unless coupled with underlying institutional
and deep reform.152 Developing an independent judiciary is essential to strength-
ening the rule of law by forestalling corruption.153 More challengingly, reforms will
be strongly resisted by the current beneficiaries who would lose their power to
extract favours.154 If China is to build a legitimate democracy, norms must change,
including political ones. It remains uncertain whether state capitalism can stand the
test of legal globalisation for a real fundamental transformation. In this regard, Hong
Kong and Singapore act as successful models given that they have been benefiting
from the rule of law, independent judiciary and zero tolerance for corruption.155
6.3 The Shifting Landscape of Localised Compliance Risks
Culture is arguably resistant to institutional changes. It can hardly be affected
simply by changes in new laws. Anti-bribery results depend upon the extent to
which the company’s incentives are tied to its performance. There is need for a
broader and multijurisdictional compliance scenario. Otherwise, foreign MNCs
would be misled and further suffer without an adequate corresponding global anti-
bribery governance regime. Fostering a culture of compliance enables multination-
als to localise their global anti-bribery mechanisms compatibly into China’s socio-
legal and cultural settings and transform the anti-bribery system. The GSK case
highlights broader concerns about the challenges of completing a compatible
transformation.156 Through fostering the culture that fuses high integrity, MNCs
will likely able be to complete the process of such a transformation.
6.3.1 A Lesson from the GSK’s Failure in its Global Compliance Strategy
There is a growing threat from domestic laws in China, as illustrated by a high-
profile prosecution of GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) in 2014. The GSK case highlights
the compliance challenges faced by foreign MNCs operating in China. Arguably,
there are many factors that might have led to this enforcement. A possibility of the
selective enforcement cannot be precluded in the context of China’s desire to reduce
150 Stolenberg (2000).
151 Rose-Ackerman and Tan (2014), p 47.
152 Rose-Ackerman and Tan (2014).
153 Boskin (2013).
154 Grennes and Strazds (2014).
155 Walsh (2013).
156 GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) China, Hunan Changsha Intermediate People’s Court,葛兰素史克中国公司
行贿案,湖南省长沙市中级人民法院 2014.9.19.
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healthcare costs. There might be an element of nationalism, and even protectionism,
since local firms are normally at a disadvantage compared to foreign MNCs with
renowned brands and reputations.157 It is also notable that China’s fragmented drug
licensing system provides ample room for rent seeking.158 Nevertheless, the GSK’s
local compliance system failed to properly detect potentially hundreds of millions of
pounds worth of bribes. GSK once announced that its internal probe had found no
evidence of bribery, and claimed to be observing codes of its integrity and ethical
standards. This only provides reductio ad absurdum, which clearly illuminates the
gaps between corporate anti-bribery policy and its effective implementations.159 It
indicates that GSK needs more than a well-written programme, but the creation of a
dynamic and strong culture which facilitates compliance.
The GSK case acts as a wake-up call for foreign MNCs, largely because it has not
perceived bribery in China as a serious compliance risk, especially when compared
to a potential BA 2010 or FCPA violation.160 The crackdown on GSK’s bribery
suggests that the Chinese enforcement agencies have given teeth to their own anti-
bribery laws.161 Although the People’s Courts are occasionally biased in favour of
local defendants, Chinese anti-bribery efforts cannot be caricatured as purely
protectionist efforts to limit competition from foreign MNCs.162 Furthermore, the
GSK case serves as a perfect example endorsing the Ninth Amendment that the
focus of anti-bribery in China is shifting from bribe takers to bribe givers. MNCs’
compliance programmes in responses only to FCPA and BA 2010 are apparently no
longer sufficient. A corporate compliance programme aimed at addressing only the
prohibitions embodied in the two Acts is destined to fall short in China. More
problematically, any anti-bribery enforcement in China is likely to trigger FCPA
and BA 2010 investigations that will have massive repercussions across significant
international business. Finally, the enforcement agencies give meaningful credit to
companies which implement in good faith a comprehensive and risk-based
compliance programme.
Assessment of risk is fundamental to developing a strong compliance
programme,163 which need to be updated to ensure it accounts for anti-bribery
risks on a global basis. Mere global compliance programmes superimposed upon
China’s regulatory environment are inadequate. MNCs must assess the bribery risk
of each jurisdiction where they operate. Failure to take these steps will result in
exposure to massive bribery liability on a global scale. It is imperative for an MNC
to enhance the due diligence process in dealing with the presence of any red flags.164
157 Dawar and Frost (1999).
158 Hook (2013).
159 Rose-Ackerman and Tan (2014).
160 Chow (2012).
161 Schipani et al. (2016).
162 Chow (2014).
163 FCPA Guidance, p 58.
164 Serious Fraud Ofﬁce v. Standard Bank Plc, No. U20150854, Southwark Crown Court, United
Kingdom, 30 November 2015, https://www.sfo.gov.uk/cases/standard-bank-plc/bank_Preliminary_1.pdf.
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Although the adequate compliance subjects a company to the least amount of
exposure to criminal liability, the short-term commercial incentive renders it
unattractive for the entity to adhere to such strategies. It is unlikely to inhibit every
employee from acting outside of the parameters of a company’s compliance
policy.165
6.3.2 The Feasibility to Foster a Compliance Culture against Bribery
It is highly feasible to design a set of anti-bribery compliance rules, which has far-
reaching implication for MNCs with global presence. The cultural dimension is
important to the implementation of a compliance programme, given that cultures
exert a powerful influence on the corporate behaviour. The impact encompasses
changes in both formal institutions and laws and MNCs’ legal behaviour. The strong
tradition of gift-giving creates a high-risk corrupt business environment. Globalising
anti-bribery compliance efforts will mitigate the risks. However, delivering the anti-
bribery culture is a challenging area and also difficult to quantify. It could contribute
to bribery, while the cultural elements, to some extent, rationalise such behaviour.
Whilst not running afoul of the FCPA or the BA 2010, MNCs must understand the
cultural uniqueness that shapes business transactions in China. Seeking to transform
social norms, MNCs’ willingness to nurture a corporate culture of zero-tolerance for
bribery is in fact contrary to the Chinese local customs and is thus doomed from the
start.166 Despite significant cultural differences between the jurisdictions, the UK,
China and the US anti-bribery authorities face challenges that are leading to
convergence in enforcement approaches. Differences in cultural values may
increase the likelihood of violations of anti-bribery law, but do not necessarily
create practical problems in extraterritorial enforcement.167 Overestimation of the
cultural variable would not only compromise the Chinese institutional globalisation
of anti-bribery law, but also comprise the localisation of MNCs’ global compliance
efforts in China.
Convergence on a single set of cultural norms seems to be highly implausible.168
To achieve purportedly objective righteous conduct, hard law to criminalise bribing
foreign officials can ultimately not only transcend the cultural distinctions, but also
restrain certain cultural declination for unlawful behaviour.169 It is critical to make
integrity and ethics a part of the overall evaluation scheme, which provides positive
incentives for compliance. Foreign MNCs’ success will require more than simply
developing greater cultural sensitivity.170 The Siemens case provides a notorious
example of a failure to implement such a policy, under which bribery was tolerated
165 Henning (2012).
166 Schipani et al. (2016).
167 Runnels and Burton (2012).
168 Nichols (1997).
169 Cao (2016), p 145.
170 Krishnarao Prahalad and Lieberthal (2003).
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and rewarded at the highest levels of the company.171 A policy of zero tolerance for
bribery is the most effective way to comply on a global scale. Such a policy renders
MNCs’ compliance exceedingly challenging, especially during a global recession.
A high-level of commitment is required to prevent persons acting on the firms’
behalf from engaging in bribery, and to foster a corporate culture in which bribery is
never tolerated.172 MNCs’ subsidiaries and branches must show evidence of their
commitment to a culture of compliance.
6.3.3 Make the Global Compliance Regimes Compatible
With global presence, it will never be enough to highlight the compatible integration
of the MNCs’ global compliance into the local anti-bribery framework. Various
developments in the Chinese legal enforcement landscape suggest that compatible
anti-bribery compliance need to be warranted. To mitigate the risks, MNCs must
turn to the aphorism ‘think global, but act local’.173 Bribery per se may not be a
cultural issue, it is imperative to integrate the specifics of a given culture into an
anti-bribery compliance programme and, specifically, its implementation. The
challenge is to adapt compliance programmes to specific environments while
respecting the same standards and principles of integrity. Bribery presents legal and
regulatory challenges, but these challenges cannot be addressed by the law in
isolation. It is imperative to integrate MNCs’ compliance programmes by efficiently
tailoring their efforts into the local legal and enforcement settings. An integrity
system integrates a set of mechanisms that both reinforce desired behaviour via a
value-orientated cultural path and deter bribery via rule-based law enforcement.174
The compatible integration needs to be carefully adapted for the Chinese market and
designed for effective implementation. Inevitably, implementation of an adequate
anti-bribery compliance programme may be resisted in particular, when a foreign
MNC ensures that bribery is not countenanced so as to reduce the incidence of
passive and active bribery.175 There is no one-size-fits-all compliance approach. It
takes time for the current global anti-bribery regime to converge on a set of
conceptual standards for theoretically defining corruption, given the universal
disapproval of bribery.176 Most foreign MNCs may have to adjust their focus on
compliance, which used to be driven primarily by external influences, such as under
the BA 2010 and the FCPA, rather than Chinese legislation.
171 SEC, ‘SEC Charges Siemens AG for Engaging in Worldwide Bribery’ (15 December 2008), https://
www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-294.htm; DoJ, ‘Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined Criminal Fines’
(15 December 2008), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-1105.html; Warin
et al. (2010a), p 56.
172 Serious Fraud Office (SFO) (2011), p 89.
173 Park and Vanhonacker (2007).
174 Paine (1994).
175 Bribery Act 2010 Guidance § 10, p 8.
176 Salbu (1999), p 241.
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7 Conclusion
This study presents a cultural analysis of bribery as an essential tool for shaping an
effective legal apparatus. The global community has taken a more streamlined and
unified approach toward bribery, that is, objections to bribery are commonly shared.
There has been a convergence of global anti-bribery norms toward outlawing the
bribery of foreign officials. The pace of consolidating domestic institutions is
escalating as globalisation continues. An international avenue could be feasible for
enhancing the enforcement mechanism in addressing transnational bribery. Some
primary anti-bribery laws, like the BA 2010 and the FCPA, do not necessarily put
the American and British corporations in a disadvantaged position in terms of global
competitiveness.
MNCs trying to embed ethical values into compliance regimes will need to
consider the particular cultural characteristics and Confucian influences on
employees’ behaviour. However, China’s culture represents only one of the
variables that are likely to contribute to bribery. A defence in the form of cultural
accommodation used by foreign MNCs, should not be well justified. While cultural
sensitivity to China’s anti-bribery laws is imperative, MNCs must cover the overlap
across jurisdictions. Regardless of the plausible ‘mother of all path dependence’,
culture does not play a decisive role in building China’s anti-bribery laws following
the track of the FCPA and the BA 2010, nor will culture be considered as a
mitigating element in the cross-border corporate criminal liability. The mitigation
considerations enshrined in both the Bribery Act Guidelines and FCPA Guidance
remain the same, in substance, as rationales behind China’s guanxi-oriented
cultures. In practice, such circumstances are usually blurred, where it is nearly
impossible to ascertain what kind of payment could constitute bribery, and what
could be acceptable as regular gifts or hospitality. The softened interpretations by
the Guidance complicate the global anti-bribery efforts, despite the golden rule of
‘prevention is better than cure’.
Anti-bribery is a section within a wide range of inroads that travel to the heart of
the institutional cultures of MNCs, of which ethical culture should be clearly
articulated. MNCs should have rigorous and well-established compliance pro-
grammes. To mitigate the exposure to litigation risks requires a relentless focus on
compliance. Adequate compliance culture can protect against violations and help
mitigate liability in case bribery should arise, while a most reliable approach is to
enhance institutional building in compliance programmes. This approach is neither
dichotomous nor between a rock and a hard place. Anti-bribery efforts are still in
their infancy in China, but are likely to grow as the world trends towards a greater
emphasis on ethically responsible global business practices. It holds particularly true
with the Chinese government prioritising its campaign against the prevalence of
corruption. MNCs should ensure that their due diligence and compliance
programmes rise to this new challenge. The increasingly aggressive enforcement
of the global anti-bribery law unquestionably poses further challenges for MNCs
operating in China. This leads MNCs to re-evaluate their anti-bribery programmes
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to ensure adequate compliance. This highlights a renewed focus on the importance
of MNCs’ effective compliance strategies for their long-term success globally.
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